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1 Introduction
There have been many studies on interbank networks since the 2007-8 nancial crisis and
they have shed many important insights. These studies take the approach that models
banks as intermediaries of loanable funds. This paper takes a di¤erent approach: We model
banks as creators of means of payment. In reality, bank deposits are widely accepted as
a means of payment. When banks lend to the real economy, they do not part sacks of
the currency from their vaults, but credit the borrowersdeposit accounts with the values
lent. That is, the means of payment that banks lend out is not the currency, but the
deposits that they create, as Keynes (1914) has observed.1 Deposits are banksliabilities.
Altogether, banks lend to the real economy their liabilities which it uses as a means of
payment. The loanable-funds approach focuses on the real value of the money that banks
lend out, but abstracts from its attribute as a means of payment. This abstraction makes
a lot of sense. Indeed, is not lending out money equivalent to lending out the real value
that this money represents? The answer seems compellingly YES. In fact, Faure and
Gersbach (2017) present a case in which the two approaches lead to the same equilibrium
allocation. However, in this paper, we demonstrate that when the circulation of money is
concerned, the money-creator approach makes a di¤erence and this di¤erence matters for
our understanding of interbank networks.
Naturally, as a means of payment, bank liability circulates in a cycle: It is rst lent
out from the banking system, then used for layers of trading, and nally deposited back
to the banking system. Naturally, a fraction of one banks liability ows out to another,
becoming the formers liability to the latter, as observed by Bianchi and Bigio (2017) and
Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000). This cycle of circulation, hence, naturally creates an
interbank liability network.2 As this lending-trading-depositing cycle is unnoticed by the
1See Chapter 2, "BANK-MONEY".
2This network is in uid because the net interbank positions are in a continuous process of clearing,
which sometimes involves debtor banks borrowing reserve from a third-party bank, that is, new interbank
liabilities being created to clear old ones. In this paper, we focus on the origination stage and abstract from
the clearing stage that follows it.
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existing studies on banking networks,3 so is the interbank network that it creates. This
is unsurprising. These studies take the loanable-funds approach and funds are invested
and returned, but, unlike means of payment, do not circulate. We model the circulation
cycle and characterize how the interbank network that it creates is interwoven with the
real economy. Moreover, we examine its implications for bank lending.
The model economy is populated by rms, households and banks. Firms own production
technologies, households multiple types of resources (e.g. land, labor), which are the inputs
for production.4 Banks play the role of bridging these two parties. To demonstrate the
di¤erence that the money-creator approach makes, we also consider a mirror economy that
is identical with the model economy except that the bridging role of banks is modelled with
the loanable-funds approach. With this approach, banks rst take deposits of resources from
households and then lend them to rms. In the model economy, banks role is modelled with
the money-creator approach. As in reality they create and lend deposits to real-economy
rms, so in the model economy banks create and lend their liabilities to rms. Then, rms
use bank liability to trade resources with households. Finally households deposit the sales
incomes with their banks, completing the circulation cycle of bank liability. These two
economies provide a level-playing eld to compare the two approaches.
In the model economy, the circulation cycle of bank liability creates a network of in-
terbank liabilities and this network is entirely determined by the real economy. Firms
production technologies determine the quantity of liability that each bank lends out and
the way that it is split as spending between the multiple types of resources. The sub-
streams of all banks liabilities spent on each type of resources merge into its sales revenue.
The distribution of resources across households and their association with banks determine
how the sales revenue of resources is split as deposits between banks. Thus inter-ows of
liability between any pair of banks, and hence the interbank liability network resultant,
are entirely determined by the fabric of the real economy. In contrast, in the mirror econ-
3Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) consider the inter-ows of deposits between banks, but they do not
consider the lending and trading stages of the circulation.
4 In the extension of the model, the inputs also include the products themselves as intermediate goods,
whereby an Input-Output (I-O) network is accommodated.
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omy, equilibrium establishes no interbank network, let alone its connection with the real
economy. In equilibrium, banks in decits of funds borrow from those in surpluses, but the
identities of the lender banks are not determined.
In reality, interbank networks that passively result from the circulation of banksliabili-
ties are important. Lights can be shed by empirical studies that look into the ows of bank
reserves. Any interbank debt so passively formed will eventually be settled with a ow
of reserves. Observe that such ows are in one direction only because the creditor banks
need not pay funds back. In contrast, active borrowing of reserves generates ows in both
directions (unless the borrower banks default): A ow of funds to the borrower now must
be paired with an inverse ow of repayment to the lender in the future. Therefore, the
volume of unpaired ows of reserve funds is indicative of the importance of passively formed
interbank debts. Furne (2003), using the Fedwire funds data, nds that during February
and March 1998 there are on average about 15; 000 ows of Fed funds per day, but identi-
es only about 3; 000 paired transactions of overnight borrowing. Typically the majority of
active interbank borrowing is overnight. Then each day about 15; 000  2 3; 000 = 9; 000
ows of Fed funds are not due to active interbank borrowing. While there must be a vari-
ety of reasons behind these ows, their sheer quantity still suggests the importance of the
passively formed interbank exposures.
Besides for interbank exposures, the circulation of bank liability also has implications
for bank lending. In the model economy, we characterize how deposits to any bank ow
from bankslending. Therefore, we capture the general equilibrium e¤ect of bank lending
on deposits. This e¤ect is important in reality. Given that bank lending has an impact
on household incomes and business prots, it naturally impacts on banksdeposits. By
capturing this impact, the money-creator approach delivers the following three new insights.
First, the interbank interest rate has a heterogeneous e¤ect on banksfunding costs. Of
each unit of liability that a bank lends out, a fraction is deposited back, and the rest ows
out to other banks becoming interbank liabilities. The former amounts to the bank being
funded by deposits. Only the latter subjects the bank to the expense of interbank interest.
Therefore, a bank with a smaller outow fraction sees its funding cost less dependent on
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the interbank interest rate. In contrast, if we use the loanable-funds approach, the funding
cost of all banks vary one-to-one with the interbank interest rate. With that approach,
banks lend out, or borrow in, the marginal unit of funds on the interbank market. The
interbank interest rate, therefore, measures the funding cost for all banks.
Second, heterogeneity in the outow fraction is a source of ine¢ ciency of bank lending.
As said above, banks with a smaller outow fraction rely more on deposits, less on interbank
borrowing, and hence have a lower funding cost.5 They charge a lower lending rate, giving
their borrower rms a nancial advantage. Thereby these rms obtain too much of the
resources. Hence the ine¢ ciency. In contrast, if we use the loanable-funds approach, the
interbank interest rate has a homogeneous e¤ect on banksfunding cost and therefore this
source of ine¢ ciency does not obtain.
Third, if we use the loanable-funds approach, other things equal, the identities of de-
positors and borrowers do not matter for banks. A deposit of one thousand dollars from
a butcher is equivalent to that from a programmer, a loan of half-million dollars to a pig-
farmer equivalent to that to a software developer. In contrast, if we use the money-creator
approach and track the circulation of bank liability, we nd the identities of depositors and
borrowers matter. For example, if a bank mainly lends to pig farmers, then deposits from
butchers benet it more than those from programmers because the former increases the
chance that the liability lent out by the bank ows back to itself, thereby reducing its fund-
ing cost. Similarly, if the banks main depositors are butchers, then a loan of half-million
dollars to a pig-farmer benets the bank more than that to a software developer.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on nancial networks; for a survey see
Allen and Babus (2009), Bougheas and Kirman (2014), Cabrales et al (2015), and Glasser-
man and Young (2015). While most of the studies in the literature consider an exogenous
network, exceptions include Freixas et. al. (2000) and recently Acemoglu et al (2014), Allen
et al (2012), Babus (2016), Farboodi (2015) and Zawadowski (2013). These studies have
shed many important insights. Freixas et. al. (2000) show the vulnerability of the banking
5 In reality, if a bank has more extensive branches, then the outow fraction tends to be smaller, because
more likely will the money that it lends out be deposited back.
5
network to mis-coordinated withdrawals in the manner of Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
Allen et. al. (2012) show that systemic risks critically depend on the funding maturity of
the banks. Both Acemoglu et al (2014) and Farboodi (2015) underline that an interbank
link can bring about both an opportunity of investment and a chance of contagion.6 Both
Acemoglu et al (2014) and Zawadowski (2013) demonstrate that ine¢ ciency is caused by
nancial-network externalities, namely that a bank fails to internalize the implication of its
decision for banks with which it is not directly linked. Babus (2016), based on Allen and
Gale (2000), shows that the mutual insurance network bears a small or even nil systemic
risk.
The existing studies all model banks as intermediaries of loanable funds. This pa-
per takes the approach that models banks as creators of means of payment. It makes a
di¤erence. First, we consider an interbank network that passively results from the lending-
trading-depositing cycle of circulation of bank liability. This cycle of circulation is uncon-
sidered by the existing studies. Apart from Freixas et al (2000), they all consider interbank
networks created by banks actively trading funds between themselves. Freixas et al (2000)
consider an interbank network formed by deposits moving around, which, with the lending
and trading stages absent, does not form the full circulation cycle. As a result, unlike us,
they do not consider the role of production technologies or I-O networks in structuring the
interbank network, not do they capture the general equilibrium e¤ect of bank lending on
deposits or derive the three new insights expounded above.
The money-creator approach of this paper is used by Wang (2019), who shows that
a purely nominal monetary policy can relax banks borrowing constraint. Other recent
studies that consider the circulation of bank liability as a means of payment in general
equilibrium7 include Bianchi and Bigio (2017), Donaldson et al (2018), Faure and Gersbach
(2016, 2017), Jakab and Kumhof (2015) and Parlour et al (2017). In particular, as the
6This trade-o¤, in a reduced form, is also studied by Blume et al (2013) and Erol and Vehra (2014).
Moreover, Glasserman and Young (2015) survey the studies on a similar trade-o¤, between the benet of
diversication and the cost of possible contagion.
7Earlier literature has examined the circulation of private liabilities as a means of payment using search-
matching frameworks, e.g. Cavalcanti et. al. (1999) and Williamson (1999).
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present paper, Faure and Gersbach (2017) and Jakab and Kumhof (2015) compare the
money-creator approach to the loanable-funds approach. The former presents a case in
which these two approaches lead to the same equilibrium allocation, the latter showing that
the two approaches di¤er substantially in their quantitative implications. These studies,
however, are not concerned with how the interbank network is determined by the real
economy.
The money-creator approach is based on the fact that banks liabilities are widely
accepted as a means of payment, whereas real-economy rmsare not. Explanations for
this fact have been o¤ered by studies unconcerned with banking networks. It is attributed
to the stronger commitment power of banks by Kiyotaki and Moore (2001), or to their
better warehousing technology by Donaldson et al (2018). It is derived by Cavalcanti et
al (1999) and Gu et al (2003) using a money-search framework. The last two papers build
on the seminal work of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) on at money. However, while our
paper is concerned with banks creating means of payment, it has nothing to do with at
money. Indeed, in Europe, banks had been creating means of payment, by lending out
their liabilities in forms of banknotes or bills of exchange, hundreds of years anterior to the
existence of at money.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is set up in Section 2. Before
it is analyzed in Section 4, we examine the mirror economy in Section 3. The model is
extended in Section 5 to accommodate the I-O network. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy lasts for two dates, t = 0 for contracting and production, and t = 1 for
yielding and consumption. We present rst the real side of the economy and then the role
of banks.
On the real side, there are N sectors, each consisting of the continuum [0; 1] of rms
which are managed by their owners. Firms use J types of resources as well as the hu-
man capital  of the managers to produce the consumption good, corn. The production
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i 2 (0; 1) ; 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ij = 1. Without loss of generality, we normalize  = 1:
All resources are owned by households: Household h 2 H := f1; 2; :::Hg owns zhj units of





for j 2 J :=f1; 2; :::; Jg: Both N and H are large numbers.
The economy also has N banks. Banks matter for the allocation of resources for a
twofold reason. First is the following friction:
Assumption 1 (the Friction): Firms cannot borrow resources directly from households,
but banks can.
Second, rms can borrow from banks. On banksasset side, we assume that there exists
bank lending specialization: Firms of sector i can only borrow from Bank i for any i 2 N:
Bank lending specialization is well documented by empirical studies.8
On banksliability side, we abstract from the process of bankscompetition for deposits
from households and model its consequence outright. First, the competition leads to a net
deposit rate of rd  0: We assume that bankscompetition for deposits is imperfect, for
which there is strong empirical evidence.9 As a result, the deposit rate rd is below the
interbank interest rate rb by a positive gap  > 0: Second, this competition leads to a
network of association of households with banks: Household h 2 H deposits a fraction
8See among others Daniels and Ramirez (2008), Jonghe et. al. (2016), Liu and Pogach (2016), Ongena
and Yu (2017), and Paravisini et. al. (2014).
9See Kopecky and Van Hoose (2012) and Matutes and Vives (2000) and the empirical studies cited
therein.
8
hi  0 of what it owns with Bank i; where
X
i2N
hi = 1 for any h 2 H: Therefore, of any

























Matrix fdjigj2J;i2N hence represents the distribution of resources between banks, prole
Ai; i; ij
	
i2N;j2J the production technologies. Together,

Ai; i; ij ; dji
	
i2N;j2J repre-
sents the real economy.
Due to the Friction, the route for rms to obtain resources from households has to be
bridged by banks. There are two approaches to model the bridging role of banks. One
is the loanable-funds approach. With this approach, banks lend out real goods typically
referred to as funds  and are modelled as intermediaries of loanable funds: They rst
borrow funds from depositors and then lend funds to rms. Using this approach, the role
of banks is then modelled as follows.
Approach LF (role of banks): At t = 0; banks rst take deposits of resources from
households and then lend the resources to rms.
In this paper, we use a di¤erent approach, which is based on an alternative way of
modelling the same friction. Observe that borrowing is a transaction in which the lender
gives up her resources in exchange for a promise of the borrower to pay her back. Borrowing
can be done if and only if the lender accepts the borrowers promise to pay for the exchange.
Therefore, the Friction, that rms cannot borrow resources from households but banks can,
is equivalent to the following assumption:
Assumption 10 (the Friction): Households shun rmspromise to pay corn at t = 1,
but accept banks, in exchange for their resources.
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This assumption captures the fact that banksliabilities (in the form of deposits) are
widely accepted as a means of payment, whereas real-economy rms are not. By this
assumption, rather than rst borrow resources from households and then lend the resources
to rms, the role of banks is modelled as follows.
Approach MC (role of banks): At t = 0; banks lend their promise to pay to rms
and rms then use it to exchange resources from households.
Hence this approach models banks as creators of means of payment, which is their
promise to pay, namely their liabilities. We dene one unit of liability as a promise to pay
one unit of corn at t = 1. At t = 0; to acquire a banks promise to pay, a rm enters a loan
contract (m;R): Presently the rm receives m units of the banks liability; and at t = 1;
the rm will repay mR units of corn to the bank (which will then redeem its liability using
the corn paid in). Thus R is the gross lending rate. After borrowing, rms use borrowed
bank liability to exchange resources from households. Let the price of type j 2 J resources
be pj : That is, one unit of them is exchanged with pj units of bank liability. Households
deposit all the sales revenue with banks, earning a deposit rate of rd. We have seen that a
fraction dji of the sales revenue of type j 2 J resources is deposited into Bank i 2 N.
At t = 0; banks liabilities thus circulate in a cycle through three stages: Lending,
trading, and depositing. This cycle of circulation is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The circulation of banksliabilities at t = 0: They are rst lent out to rms,
then split as spending between the multiple types of resources, and nally deposited back
into the banking system.
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The circulation of bank liability generates interbank liability links. In this economy,
there is no risk of bank default and each banks promise to pay one unit of corn at t = 1 is
worth one unit of corn at t = 0. Therefore, banksliabilities are one-to-one exchangeable
at t = 0. Hence, when F units of Bank ns liability is deposited with Bank i, what Bank i
does is as follows. It adds F units of credit to the depositors account on the liability side.
On the asset side, it now holds Bank ns promise to pay F units of corn, that is, Bank n
owes a debt of F to Bank i. Given that the net interbank interest rate is rd+; the deposit
changes Bank is balance sheet as follows.
Assets Liabilities
Old assets: X Old liabilities: X
Debt owed by Bank n: F  (1 + rd + ) The account of the depositor: F (1 + rd)
Gain to the equity: F  
Table 1: The balance sheet of Bank i with a deposit of F units of Bank ns liability
We will track the ows of liability between each pair (i; n) of banks and thus determine
the net position ni between them. These net positions together form an network of
interbank connections fnig(n;i)2NN at t = 0:
At t = 1; rms produce corn. A rm that borrowed m units of bank liability at t = 0
repays the bank with mR units of corn to clear the debt. Banks then use the corn of loan
repayment to settle their liabilities to other banks and the depositors. Lastly, households,
rmsmanager-owners and bank shareholders consume the corn that they have obtained.
Remarks on the model:
This paper aims to investigate the interbank network that results from the circulation
of bank liability as a means of payment. We intend to use a model that contains only the
elements necessary for this investigation. Hence, we have abstracted from several real-life
facts.
First, in reality, when banks issue loans by creating deposits, they are typically subject
to constraints regarding the reserve rate and the capital adequacy rate. We abstract from
these constraints; incorporating them will not qualitatively change the papers results.
11
Second, in reality, banks issue nominal liability, that is, a promise to pay at money,
whereas in the paper banks issue promises to pay corn, a real good. This abstraction is
intended to show that banks creation of means of payment is unrelated to at money.
It also gives us the convenience of using a nite-period model for the investigation. The
abstraction is harmless. After all, the way in which bank liability circulates is unchanged
if banksliabilities are nominal.
Third, we have abstracted from the process of bankscompetition for deposits, because
it is an independent issue to our investigation. Suppose our setting is extended to explicitly
model this competition. Then in equilibrium, there will be a specic deposit rate rd and
a specic distribution fdjigj2J;i2N of resources. The part of the equilibrium that concerns
the circulation of bank liability and the resultant interbank network will coincide with the
equilibrium of our model with the parameters rd and fdjigj2J;i2N taking these specic
values. Any particular way of modelling the competition does not matter, so long as it is
imperfect and thus leaves a gap  > 0 between the interbank interest rate rb and banks
deposit rate rd. This gap certainly exists in reality.
Equilibrium is dened as follows, where P := fpjgj2J denotes the vector of resource
prices. Given there is a large number of banks, each bank is too small to a¤ect the resource
prices and hence takes them as given.




forms an equilibrium, if
(a) given (Ri;P) ; mi is the optimal demand of Bank is liability by rms of sector i;
(b) given P; fRngn2N=fig and the demand function mi(Ri;P), Ri is the optimal interest
rate that the Bank i charges; and
(c) for each j 2 J; pj clears the market for type j resources.
We will demonstrate how in equilibrium the interbank liability network fing(i;n)2NN
is determined by the real economy

Ai; i; ij ; dji
	
i2N;j2J : Passing on to that, however,
we consider a mirror economy that is the identical with the model economy except that
banksrole is modelled with Approach LF instead of Approach MC above. This provides
a level-playing eld to compared the two approaches.
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3 The Mirror Economy Where Banks Are Modelled with
Approach LF
In the mirror economy, the real side is still

Ai; i; ij ; dji
	
i2N;j2J and rms of sector i still
borrow only from Bank i for any 2 N: However, banksrole is modelled with Approach
LF: At t = 0; they rst take deposits of resources in and then lend them out. Specically,
Bank i rst receives deposits of dji fraction of type j resources for all j 2 J and then
lend them to sector i rms, while also borrowing resources from, or lending them to, other
banks. A di¢ culty immediately arises. There is no obvious way to insert the market where
resources are traded and their prices P are determined. Indeed, if rms have obtained all
the resources via borrowing from banks, this market seems redundant. However, let us not
dwell on this issue; let us suppose that with certain modelling techniques, this di¢ cultly
can be overcome and the resource prices P in units of corn can be determined in a manner
of market clearing.
Consider rmsborrowing decision. If a rm of sector i borrows a prole fxijgj2J of





Given the banks gross lending rate R; at t = 1 the rm repays mR units of corn to settle
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i  miR; s.t. (1). (2)















:= mi (R;P) : (3)
Now consider bankslending decisions. On the liability side, Bank i is deposited with






for which the bank pays a gross deposit rate of 1 + rd: On the asset side, if Bank i charges
a gross lending rate of Ri; then the demand of its funds is Mi = mi (Ri;P) ; from which it
earns revenue MiRi: The surplus (or decit) Di  Mi of funds is lent (or borrowed) on the
interbank market, earning a gross interest rate of 1 + rd + : Therefore, Bank is value is
i = MiRi + (Di  Mi) (1 + rd + ) Di (1 + rd)
= Mi (Ri   (1 + rd)) + (Di  Mi) : (5)
Formula (5) is intuitive: The prot margin of lending is Ri   (1 + rd) and the interbank
credit position Di Mi bears a net return rate of ; the gap between the interbank interest
rate rb and the deposit rate rd. The banks problem is
max
Ri
Mi (Ri   (1 + rd)) + (Di  Mi) ; s.t. Mi = mi (Ri;P) : (6)




(1 + rd + ) : (7)
Of this formula, the term 1=i is the mark-up factor due to the monopolistic power that
Bank i has over the rms of sector i; and the term in the brackets is the marginal cost of
lending of the bank, denoted by cLFi : Because 1 + rd +  = 1 + rb;
cLFi = 1 + rb: (8)
This equation is intuitive. The opportunity cost of each unit of funds lent out to rms is
the interbank rate 1 + rb because if it is not lent to rms, it can be put on the interbank
market earning returns at rate 1 + rb.
We will make four observation regarding the mirror economy. First, from Problem (6),
for the lending decision of Bank i; only the total quantity of deposits Di and that of loans
Mi matter, but the identities of the depositors and the borrowers do not. That is, for
banks, other things equal, a deposit of one thousand dollars from a butcher is the same as
that from a programmer and a loan of half-million dollars to a pig-farmer is the same as
that to a software developer.
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Second, @cLFi =@rb = 1 for all i 2 N; that is, the marginal lending cost for all banks
varies one-to-one with the interbank interest rate rb. That is intuitive. In the mirror
economy, when making the lending decision, banks take the quantity of funds deposited in
as given, and the opportunity cost of funds is the interbank interest rate, homogeneous for
all banks.
Third, the equilibrium establishes no network of interbank liabilities. Bank is net
interbank liability position is i = Mi   Di: In the generic case, i 6= 0 in equilibrium.
However, the identities of the counterparties of its interbank positions are indeterminate.
Fourth, due to the Cobb-Douglas form of the production technologies, rms of sector
n 2 N spend a fraction nj of funds they borrow on type j resources. Suppose that with the
loanable-funds approach, somehow the equilibrium resource prices P are still determined










Proposition 1 If i =  for any i 2 N; the equilibrium attains the First-Best allocation.
That is, the only source of lending ine¢ ciency in the mirror economy is the heterogeneity
in banksmonopolistic power.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the mirror economy (as well as in the model economy), resources are allocated be-
tween rms, and rms are all subject to the monopolistic power of their banks. Therefore,
the monopolistic power per se is not necessarily a source of ine¢ ciency. By the proposi-
tion, if all the rms are subject to the monopolistic power of the same strength i.e. all
i =  then its e¤ects for the resource allocation are cancelled out. However, if banks
monopolistic power is heterogeneous, this heterogeneity is a source, and the only source, of
lending ine¢ ciency.
We summarize the above four observations in the following proposition.
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Proposition 2 In the mirror economy, which is the identical with the model economy
except that banksrole is modelled with Approach LF, the following claims are true.
(1) The equilibrium establishes no network of interbank liabilities, let alone its connec-
tion with the real economy.
(2) Banksfunding cost varies one-to-one with the interbank interest rate.
(3) The identities of depositors and borrowers do not matter for banks.
(4) the heterogeneity in i is the only source of lending ine¢ ciency.
These claims are not true if banks are modelled with Approach MC, as is shown in the
next section.
4 The Interbank Liability Network Determined by the Real
Economy
We go back to the model economy in which the Friction is represented by Assumption 10
and banks are modelled as creators of means of payment. In this economy, rmsproblem
is represented in the same way as in the mirror economy. Because banks do not default, a
unit of bank liability (i.e. a banks promise to pay one unit of corn) is worth one unit of
corn. The prices in units of corn in the mirror economy are thus equivalent to the prices
in units of bank liability. If at t = 0 a sector i rm acquires mi units of Bank is liability,
then the rms budget constraint is X
j2J
pjxij = mi;
exactly the same as (1). Given the gross lending rate R of the bank, at t = 1 the rm
repays miR units of corn to settle the debt, as before. Hence, the rms decision problem
is the same as that given by (2), its demand function for Bank is liability mi (R;P) the
same as that given by (3). For borrowers, indeed, money is equivalent to the real value
that it represents, and the money-creator approach makes no di¤erence.
Now consider banksdecision problem. If Bank i charges lending rate Ri; then it lends
Mi = mi (Ri;P) units of its liability to sector i rms at t = 0 and will receive MiRi
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units of corn in return at t = 1: Out of these Mi units of liability, suppose Down units
are deposited back with Bank i; Mi   Down units owing out to other banks becoming
interbank liabilities. For the inverse ows, let Dother denote the quantity of other banks
liabilities that are deposited with Bank i: Given that the gross deposit rate is 1 + rd and





Depositors of its own liability
(Down(1+rd))
Depositors of other banksliability
(Dother(1+rd))
Credit to other banks whose liabilities
are deposited with Bank i
(Dother(1+rd+))
Debt owed to the banks with which
Bank is liability is deposited
((Mi Down)(1+rd+))
Equity (i)
Table 2: Bank is balance sheet at the end of t = 0
The banks deposits sum up to Di = Down +Dother. The banks net liability position
to other banks i = (Mi  Down)   Dother = Mi   Di, the same as what have seen
with the loanable-funds approach. The banks value i = MiRi + Dother(1 + rd + )  
[Di (1 + rd) + (Mi  Down) (1 + rd + )] : With a little rearrangement,
i =Mi (Ri   (1 + rd)) + (Di  Mi) ; (10)
which is the same as formula (5) of the banks value in the mirror economy. That is
intuitive. When accounting is concerned, money is equivalent to the value it represents,
otherwise, banks create value out of thin air, which no one can do.
A di¤erence is made when we comes to money circulation. Funds, as a real good, are
invested and returned, but they do not circulate. In contrast, banksliabilities, as a means
of payment, naturally circulate. Consider the circulation of any Bank ns liability. First,
Mn units of it are lent to sector n rms. Then, according to the Cobb-Douglas technology
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of the rms, a nj fraction of the banks liability is spent on type j resources. It follows









Mnnjdji: With some rearrangement,
Di =Mi  fii +
X
n2N=fig
Mn  fni; (12)





is the fraction of bank ns liability owing into Bank i: Out of one unit of liability that
Bank n lends out, fraction nj is spent on each type j 2 J of resources and out of this
spending fraction of dji is deposited into Bank i, hence in total a fraction fni of Bank ns
liability owing into Bank i.
Considering that Mnfni units of Bank ns liability ow to Bank i and inversely Mifin
units of Bank is liability ow to Bank n; the net liability position of Bank i to Bank n is
hence in =Mifin  Mnfni: Therefore, the circulation of banksliabilities naturally gives
rise to an interbank liability network  = fing(i;n)2NN : In contrast, no such a network
arises in the mirror economy.
Moreover, according to equation (12), for any Bank i; each Bank n 2 N sees fraction
fni of the means of paymentMn that it lends out ows to Bank i and all these ows merges
together to form Bank is deposits Di: We thus capture the general equilibrium e¤ect of
lending by the banking system on banksdeposits. Substitute (12) for Di in equation (10)
and Bank is value is




The banks problem is hence:
max
Ri
i (Ri) ; s:t: Mi = mi (R;P) :
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[1 + rd + (1  fii) ] : (14)
As in the mirror economy, the term 1= is the mark-up factor due to the monopolistic
power of Bank i and the term in the square brackets is the banks marginal cost of lending,
denoted by cMCi : Because  = (1 + rb)  (1 + rd) ;
cMCi = fii (1 + rd) + (1  fii) (1 + rb) : (15)
For intuition of equation (15), observe that out of each unit of liability that Bank i lends
out, fii unit circulates back to the bank and the rest 1  fii unit ows out to other banks,
becoming interbank liabilities. For the former, the bank pays the deposit rate 1 + rd; and
for the latter, the interbank rate 1 + rb. Hence equation (15).
Finally, with the money-creator approach, at the trading stage of the circulation, nat-
urally markets open where rms use bank liability to exchange resources with households
and the resource prices P are determined. We have found the aggregate spending on type
j resources Ej in (11). With bank n charges interest rate Rn; the size of its lending is
Mn = mn (R

n;P). The aggregate demand for type j resources is Ej=pj ; while the aggre-







n;P)nj = Xj : (16)
These market clearing conditions together determine the equilibrium resource prices P.
We prove the existence of a unique equilibrium in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 There is a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium establishes a unique inter-
bank liability network  = fing(i;n)2NN ; of which the entry in is the net liability that
Bank i owes to Bank n and
in = mi (R

i ;P
) fin  mn (Rn;P) fni;
where function mi (R;P) is given by (3), Ri by (14), and fni by (13).
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Proof. See Appendix.
Thus far, we have considered the two economies that are identical except the way in
which the role of banks is modelled. It is modelled with the loanable-funds approach in
the mirror economy and the money-creator approach in the model economy. The two
economies are compared in the subsection below, so as to elicit the new insights that the
money-creator approach sheds.
4.1 The new insights
1. The Interbank network  is determined by the real economy

Ai; i; ij ; dji
	
i2N;j2J.
In the model economy, the equilibrium establishes a unique interbank liability network
 = fmi (Ri ;P) fin  mn (Rn;P) fnig(i;n)2NN :














mined both by the technologies and the resource distribution fdjigj2J;i2N : The interbank
liability network ; in its entirety, is determined by and interwoven with the real economy
Ai; i; ij ; dji
	
i2N;j2J : In contrast, if we follow the loanable-funds approach, by Proposi-
tion 2, the equilibrium establishes no network of interbank liabilities, let alone its connection
with the real economy. The di¤erence arises because in the model economy, banks pump
out their liabilities, which, as a means of payment, naturally circulate in a cycle (as il-
lustrated in Figure 1), and the inter-ows of banksliabilities create an interbank liability
network. In contrast, in the mirror economy, banks lend out funds, and while banks do
run a surplus or decit of funds, the identities of their counterparties are indeterminate
without further assumptions.
2. The interbank interest rate rb has a heterogeneous e¤ect on bankslending cost.
In the model economy, by (15), @cMCi =@rb = 1   fii: That is, a unit increase in the
interbank rate rb raises Bank is lending cost by 1   fii unit, where 1   fii is the outow
fraction of the bank. In contrast, if we follow the loanable-funds approach, all banks
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lending cost varies one to one with the interbank rate rb. The di¤erence arises because in
the model economy, out of each unit of liability that Bank i lends out, fraction fii unit
circulates back, only the rest 1   fii unit owing out to other banks and subjecting the
bank to the expense of interbank interest. In contrast, this e¤ect of lending on deposits
is unconsidered with the loanable-funds approach. Instead, when making lending, banks
take the size of their deposits as given. They hence lend out, or borrow in, the marginal
unit of funds on the interbank market. The interbank interest rate, therefore, measures the
funding cost for all banks.
3. The identities of depositors and borrowers matter.
The higher the owed-back fraction fii, the lower is the lending cost of Bank i because
the cost of the owed-back liability is lower than that of the owed-out by a gap  > 0:
By (13), fii =
X
j2J





fdjigj2J : Intuitively, if the borrowers of a bank heavily use a type j resources (i.e. ij
is high), then a deposit of the sales revenue of this type of resources channels more of
the money that the bank lends out to ow back to itself, thus beneting it more, than a
deposit of another types, even if the two deposits are of the identical size in equilibrium.
Similarly, although in the model economy, the borrowers of a bank use the same production
technology, in general, if a bank is deposited with a great fraction of the sales revenue of a
type j resources (i.e. dji is high), then a borrower that uses more of this type of resources
benets the bank more than one that uses less of it. For example, a deposit of ten-thousand
dollars from a pig-farmer benets the bank more than that from a programmer if the bank
mainly lends to sausage producers; a loan of half a million dollars to a sausage producer is
more protable than that to a software developer if the bank receive deposits mainly from
pig-farmers. That is, the identities of depositors and borrowers matter, whereas they do
not if we follow the loanable-funds approach according to Proposition 2.
4. Heterogeneity in the outow fraction is a source of lending ine¢ ciency.
If we follow the loanable-funds approach, by Proposition 2, the heterogeneity in i is
the only source of lending ine¢ ciency. In contrast, if we follow the money-creator approach,
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we identify a new source of lending ine¢ ciency: Heterogeneity in the outow fraction 1 fii
of banks. Intuitively, from (15) Bank is lending cost is cMCi = 1 + rd + (1  fii) : Hence,
the smaller the outow fraction 1  fii; the lower the lending cost of Bank i; and hence the
lower the lending rate of the bank, which gives Sector i rms an advantage that is irrelevant
to their production technology. As a result, they obtain too many resources relative to the
First-Best allocation.
To exmine this point in a simple manner, we consider a special case in which all the








for any i 2 N and j 2 J: Because i =  for all i 2 N; the equilibrium would attain the
rst-best allocation if we follow the loanble-funds approach. Given that all the sectors have





, rms of di¤erent sectors










model economy. All the rms spend a fraction j of the budget on type j 2 J resources.







By (3), mi is in proportion to (1=Ri)
1
1  ; while the gross lending rate Ri, by (14), is in















which is di¤erent to the socially optimal allocation given in (17) if banks have a heteroge-
neous outow fraction 1  fii: To characterize which sectors obtain too much of resources
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relative to the rst allocation, and which too little, we dene the average marginal lending























for any i 2 N and j 2 J: A sector i 2 N
obtains too much of resources if Bank is lending cost cMCi < c
e and too little if cMCi > c
e:
Sectors associated with banks that have the minimum outow fraction obtain the greatest
quantity of resources, those with the maximum outow fraction the smallest. Moreover, the
higher the gap ; the more the former sectors obtain and the less the latter.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus far, we have examined how the interbank network resulting from money circula-
tion is structured by the production technologies and the resource distribution of the real
economy. In the next section, the model is extended to incorporate an Input-Output (I-O)
network, where, therefore, the economy has multiple consumption goods. This multiplicity
imposes two technical di¢ culties. One is that we need an ex-post market to determine the
(relative) prices of the multiple goods and this market need open before the loan repayment.
The other is the following. Thus far, the model economy has only one consumption good
corn and it is convenient to allow rms to use corn for the settlement of their loans. It
is no longer so in the extension where there are multiple consumptions, otherwise, banks
each end up with multiple goods and a new goods market need open to exchange them
after the loan settlement. Both di¢ culties can be overcome by requiring rms to settle the
loans with bank liability instead of their product. First, this requirement commands that
a market open before the loan settlement where rms sell their product for bank liability,
a market where the relative price of multiple goods will be determined if they exist. This
helps overcome the rst di¢ culty is overcome. Second, as will be shown, this requirement
also leads banks to issue new liability to buy rmsproduct on this market. This helps
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overcome the second di¢ culty. Therefore, the present model is thus modied to accommo-
date the requirement in the following subsection, before we pass on to the extension. This
modication certainly draws the model closer to reality as well. As the net deposit rate rd
plays no role whatsoever, hereafter we assume rd = 0.
4.2 A Modication of the Present Model
In this subsection, rms are required to repay loans with money  i.e. bank liability 
instead of their product. Hence, at t = 1; a market opens before the loan settlement where
rms sell their product for bank liability. On this market, among buyers are naturally
households, which have sold their resources to rms and are holding bank liability as
deposits of their sales revenue. Banks are buyers too; in equilibrium banks will issue new
liability to buy corn on the market. Otherwise, the aggregate demand of money by rms,
which is equal to the aggregate loan obligations
X
i2N
MiRi; is greater than the aggregate
supply, namely the aggregate of deposits
X
i2N
Di: That is because all the deposits, in





Mi and Ri > 1 for any i 2 N: The clearing of the corn market,
therefore, commands that banks issue new liability to buy corn at t = 1; indeed, that is
how they obtain their real prot. The timing of events at t = 1 is accordingly changed as
follows.
1. Firms produce corn.
2. Each Bank i 2 N issues Ti units of new liability (i.e. promise to pay corn later
within date 1). Then, the corn market opens, where banks use the newly issued liabilities
and households use bank liability that they have deposited at t = 0 to buy corn from rms.
3. Firms use the money from the sale of corn to clear their debts. In particular, sector
i rms each pay back MiRi units of bank liability to Bank i: Observe that part of these
MiRi units of bank liability might be the liability of a bank j 6= i: Hence, new interbank
liabilities are formed as a result of loan settlement.
4. All the interbank liabilities are netted and then settled with a payment of corn. Note
that the interbank liabilities formed previously at t = 0 bear interest at rate ; while those
24
newly formed bear none as they are almost immediately cleared.
5. Corn is consumed.
At stage 3, rms can use any banksliabilities to settle their debts. Therefore, at stage
2 the prices of all banksliabilities in the unit of corn are the same, denoted by p. As we
can see, p = 1; that is, a unit of bank liability is equivalent to one unit of corn. Therefore,
no part of the previous analysis needs to change.
Proposition 5 p = 1 and the aggregate new issuance is equal to the aggregate bank prot
in equilibrium.
Proof. We construct the aggregate demand D (p) for bank liability and the aggregate
supply S (p) and then show the unique price equating the demand to the supply is p = 1:
Regarding the demand, sector i rms want to obtain MiRi units of bank liability as long
as it can a¤ord it, namely, MiRip  Yi; where Yi is the quantity of their output, otherwise,
the rms default and demand Yi=p units of money. Hence, the demand of sector i rms
is min (MiRi; Yi=p) : Observe that given any price of bank liability p at t = 1, at t = 0 no
rms will borrow such a quantity of it that they will default at t = 1. Taking into account
rmsborrowing decision at t = 0; hence, we are not concerned with the part of p where




the aggregate loan repayments.
Now consider the supply. Bank i has issued Mi units of liability at date 0, which will
be used by households to buy corn on the market at t = 1. If it newly issues Ti units
of liability, it obtains Tip units of corn and there are Mi + Ti units of its liability on the
market. All of them will return back to the banking system because no households or
rms want bank liability at the end of t = 1. Bank i receives MiRi units of liability
(its own or other banks) from the loan repayments. Hence, its net interbank liability is
thus Mi + Ti  MiRi = Ti  Mi (Ri   1) ; which the bank clears using corn of as amount.
Altogether, with the new issuance, the banks value is i = Tip   [Ti  Mi (Ri   1)] +
(Di  Mi)  =Mi (Ri   1)+(Di  Mi) +Ti (p  1) : The prot margin of the new issuance
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is hence p  1: This is intuitive: One more liability newly issued can be used to buy p units
of corn, but it adds one unit of interbank liability which needs one unit of corn to clear.
Therefore, the aggregate of newly issued liabilities is
T (p) =
8>>><>>>:
1 if p > 1
[0;1] if p = 1
0 if p < 1
9>>>=>>>;




Mi is the aggregate quantity issued at t = 0 or the aggregate deposits.
Observe that M < L: The aggregate demand and supply functions are thus illustrated by
Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: The aggregate demand and supply of bank liability on the corn market at stage
2 of t = 1







or equivalently T (p) =
X
i2N
Mi (Ri   1) ; that is, the aggregate new issuance equals the
aggregate bank prot.
While the aggregate new issuance is pinned down in equilibrium, individual banksis
not. At p = 1; banks are indi¤erent between issuing new liability to buy corn on the
market and obtaining corn from its interbank credit positions. This indeterminacy leads
to multiple equilibria. In what follows we focus on one in which Bank i newly issues
Ti = i = Mi (R

i   1)   i for any i 2 N; that is, each bank obtains all its prot from
the corn market, none from the interbank clearance. This equilibrium will be referred
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to as the convenient equilibrium. It is called so because of the convenience that in this
equilibrium, interbank liabilities are wholly cleared by netting, no payment of corn needed.
5 Extension: The I-O Network and the Interbank Network
In order to incorporate the I-O network, certain changes to the previous model in section 2
need to be made. First, in the previous model, all sectors produce one and the same good.
Now they produce di¤erent goods. Sector i 2 N produces good i: These goods can be
used both for consumption and as an intermediate good for production. More specically,
in sector i 2 N; an rm uses a bundle of resources fxijgj2J and a bundle of intermediate












where i 2 (0; 1) ; all the other power coe¢ cients are non-negative,
X
j2J
ij = 1 andX
n2N
win = 1 for any i 2 N: i represents the importance of resources and win the rel-
ative importance of intermediate good n in the production of good i:
Second, in the baseline model, for each sector i 2 N; there is only one bank that is
Bank i that monopolizes lending to all rms of the sector. Keeping this assumption would
imply a situation where Bank is lending decision, by a¤ecting all the producers of good i,
would have a non-negligible e¤ect on the price of the good. This e¤ect seems unrealistic.
To avoid it, in the extension, we assume that in each sector there is a large number B of
symmetric banks, each of which monopolizes lending to fraction 1=B of rms in the sector.
As a result, a single bank still has only negligible inuence on the price of any good or any
resource, and is thus a price taker. To simplify exposition, in our analysis below, for each
sector i 2 N we group all the B banks of the sector into one bank and refer to it as Bank i.
Third, given there are multiple goods, the utility function of households, rm manager-
owners and bank shareholders is now assumed to be:





where n  0 for any n 2 N and
X
n2N
n = 1: If i = 0; then good i is not a consumption
good, but an intermediate good solely. The Cobb-Douglas form of the utility function again
means that the aggregate consumption spending on good n is fraction n of the aggregate
income.
We pick good 1 as the numeraire. As such, bank liability takes the form of a promise
to pay good 1. As in the previous model, one unit of liability is dened as a promise to
pay one unit of good 1.
Lastly, as in the previous model, we model banksrole with the money-creator approach.
In parallel to Assumption 1, the friction of the economy is represented by the following
assumption.
Households shun rmspromise to pay corn at t = 1, but accept banks, in exchange
for their resources.
Assumption 2: Firmspromise to pay is not accepted, but banksis, to exchange for
intermediate goods or resources.
At t = 0; the rm receives m units of the banks liability and at t = 1; the rm pays mR
units of corn to the bank, where R is the gross interest rate of lending. After borrowing,
rms use borrowed bank liability to exchange resources from households. Let the price of
type j 2 J resources be pj : That is, one unit of these resources is exchanged for pj units of
bank liability. Households deposit all the sales revenue with banks, earning a deposit rate
of rd. We have seen that household h 2 H deposits a fraction hi of its income with Bank
i 2 N and as a result a fraction dji of the sales revenue of type j 2 J resources is deposited
into Bank i 2 N.
In particular, to obtain intermediate goods at t = 1, rms have to place orders at t = 0
with the full payment in the form of bank liability. The timing of events at t = 0 is then
as follows.
1. Bank i 2 N posts the gross interest rate of lending Ri.
2. Firms of sector i 2 N borrow mi units of Bank is liability and use it as a means
of payment to buy type j resources at price pj for j 2 J and and to order intermediate
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good n at price qn for n 2 N= fig : In equilibrium, this price will be the same as the goods
price at t = 1: Hence, each rm of sector i obtains revenue vi = qi
P
n2N=fig yni from the
pre-sale order of its product. To simplify exposition, we assume that the debt that rms
owe to their banks is non-callable, that is, they cannot use the pre-sale revenue to partly
clear their debt at t = 0. As a result, rms of sector i; while presently depositing vi with
Bank i; are still obligated to pay back miRi to the bank at t = 1:
3. Households deposit their sales incomes, with fraction dji of the sales revenue of type
j resources deposited with Bank i for j 2 J; i 2 N:
4. Interbank liabilities are bilaterally netted, whereby we nd the net liability position
in between any pair of Banks i and n 2 N= fig :
As was said in subsection 4.2, in the extension, rms settle their loans using bank
liability. Hence, the timing at t = 1 follows that in subsection 4.2 and is as follows.
1. Firms produce the goods. In this process, all the intermediary goods that have been
ordered at t = 0 are delivered.
2. Each Bank i 2 N issues Ti units of new liability. Then, the goods markets open,
where banks use the newly issued liabilities and households use deposits to buy goods from
rms. Firms use the sales revenue plus that from pre-sale orders of value vi for sector i
rms to buy goods that they do not produce by themselves.
3. Firms use bank liability that remains with them to settle their loans. As a result of
this debt settlement, new interbank liabilities are formed.
4. Interbank liabilities are cleared, rst with netting and then with good 1.
5. Agents consume the goods that they have obtained.
As was shown in subsection 4.2, on the good markets at stage 2 of t = 1; bank liability
is valued at par, that is, one unit of bank liability is worth one unit of good 1. We focus on
the convenient equilibrium with Bank is new issuance Ti = i for any i 2 N and interbank
liabilities are wholly cleared with netting. As before, P =(p1; p2; :::; pJ) denotes the vector
of resource prices. Let Q := (q1; q2; :::; qN ) denote the vector of the good prices. Given
good 1 being the numeraire., q1 = 1:
As before, we start with the analysis of rmsdemand for bank liability. Suppose at
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t = 0; a sector i rm borrows mi units of bank liability to buy a bundle of factors of
production fxijgj2J and order a bundle of intermediate goods fyingn2N=fig : Then, the





qnyin = mi: (20)





from the orders of its own product and deposits this revenue with Bank i. At t = 1; out of
the total product yi, yii has been used for its own production and
P
n2N=fig yni has been





































where the rst term represents the gross revenue of its production, denoted by si that is,
si := qi (yi   yii) and the second the total cost. This gross revenue si needs to be tracked
because it will be used for the market -clearing of good i: At the optimum, the spending
on each input that depends on bank nance that is, any type j 2 J of resources and any









To understand these fractions, note that in the rms production, its own product takes
weight
 i := i (1  i)wii: (25)
Thus, the rest of the outputs, those that depend on bank nance, altogether take weight
i    i (recall that 1   i is the weight for the human capital of the rms manager-
owner). Hence, the fraction of spending on type j resources is thus iiij= (i    i) =
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iij= (1  (1  i)wii) and that on intermediate good n is thus  (1  i)win= (i    i) =





























































:= si (R;P;Q) ;
(27)






















Now we move to consider banksdecision problem. If Bank i 2 N charges Ri; it lends
out Mi = mi (Ri;P;Q) units of its liability. Then, similar to Table 2 of the preceding




Deposit of its own liability by households
(Down)
Deposit of other banksliability by households
(Dother)
Deposit of other bankss liability by sector i rms
(vi)
Credit to other banks whose liabilities
are deposited with Banki
((Dother+vi)(1+))
Debt owed to the banks with which




Table 3: a banks balance sheet at the end of t = 0
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The banks total deposits Di = Down + Dother + vi; of which DHi := Down + Dother
is from households, vi from sector i rms. We can nd its net interbank liability position
i =Mi  Di, the same as (??), and its value
i =Mi (Ri   1  ) Di: (29)
To calculate Di; we rst nd DHi ; the deposits from households of the sales revenue of
resources, and then vi, the deposits from the sector i rms. Regarding the former, similar








Of this spending, fraction dji is deposited into Bank i. Hence, the deposits into the bank
from households are in total equal to
DHi =Mi  fHii +
X
n2N=fig
Mn  fHni ;







is the fraction of its liability deposited into Bank i by households. Observe that fHni equals
the fraction in the preceding section (given by 13) multiplied by n= [1  (1  n)wnn],
because here not all but only fraction n= [1  (1  n)wnn] of Bank ns liability is spent
on resources.
The deposit from the rms with Bank i is the pre-sale revenue vi of their product. By





denote the fraction of Bank ns liability that ows into Bank i due to the sector i rms



























njdji + (1  n)wni
1A ; (35)
is the total fraction of Bank ns liability that ows into to Bank i: Observe from (34) that
while other banks liabilities are brought into Bank i via depositing by both households
and rms (hence fHni + f
E
ni); only household depositing can bring the money that Bank i
lends out back to itself, because its borrower rms need no bank nance to obtain their
own product.
























; s:t:Mi = mi (Ri;P;Q) ;
where the demand function mi (R;P;Q) is given by (26). As was said, a single bank has
negligible e¤ects on prices (P;Q). Hence, the bank takes (P;Q) as given in solving the
above decision problem. The optimum lending rate of Bank i, denoted by Ri ; is then:
Ri =
1   i









Similar to formula (14) for the optimal lending rate in the preceding section, the rst term
is the mark-up factor due to the banks monopolistic power over the rms; and the term
in the square parentheses is the marginal cost of lending. Here the mark-up factor is no
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longer 1=i because the input of intermediate good i is self nanced. The lending size of
Bank i as function of prices is thus
Mi (P;Q) = mi (R

i ;P;Q) ; (37)
and the gross revenue of a rm in sector i is thus
si (P;Q) = si (R

i ;P;Q) ;
where functions mi (R;P;Q) and si (R;P;Q) are respectively given by (26) and (27).
Now we determine prices (P;Q) using market clearing conditions. The total spending
Ej on type j resources is given by (30) and their total supply in value is pjXj : The market





= pjXj : (38)






Recall that the gross revenue of a rm producing good i is si = qi (yi   yii) and the total
value of the good i used as an intermediate good for other sectors is vi = qi
P
n2N=fig yni:
Hence, the market clearing for good i is
qici + vi = si: (39)
Alternatively, the equation says that the rm obtains revenue by selling good i either to






ni := vi (P;Q) :
Because of the the Cobb-Douglas form of the utility function in (19), the aggregate con-
sumption spending on good i  that is qici  is i fraction of the aggregate income,X
n2N




(sn (P;Q)  vn (P;Q)) = si (P;Q)  vi (P;Q) : (40)
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Only N   1 of these N equations are independent.10 Pick any N   1 of them and these
N   1 equations and the J resource-market clearing equations (given by 38) determine all
the other N + J   1 prices than q1 (which is 1). Thus price prole (P;Q) is determined.
The whole equilibrium prole is thus determined. In the same way in which Proposition











resource distribution fdjig(j;i)2JN and the Input-Output network fwing(i;n)2NN of the
real economy determines a unique interbank liability network fing(i;n)2NN, of which the
entry in is the net liability that Bank i owes to Bank n and
in =Mi (P;Q) fin  Mn (P;Q) fni;
where Mi (P;Q) ; given by (37), is Bank is lending size, and fin; to be found with (35), is
the fraction of money lent out by Bank i owing into Bank n.
6 Conclusion
The existing studies on banking networks have shed many important insights using the
loanable-funds approach. This approach focuses on the real value of the money that banks
lend out, but abstracts from its attribute as a means of payment. In this paper, we highlight
this attribute: Banks lend to the real economy their liabilities which it uses as a means
of payment. Using this approach, we shed four new insights that have eluded the existing
studies.
First, the circulation of bank liability as a means of payment creates an interbank lia-
bility network and this network is structured by the real economy. As a means of payment,
banks liabilities naturally circulate following the real economic activity, and one banks
liability naturally ows into another. These inter-ows of liability create a network of
10As is well known, if the markets for N   1 goods clear, then the market for the remained good clears
too. A straight way to see this is to note that summing up both sides of (40) over i 2 N reaches an identity.
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interbank exposures. Because these ows are directed by the real economic activity, the
structure of this network is entirely determined by the fabric of the real economy.
Second, the interbank interest rate has a heterogeneous e¤ect on banksfunding cost.
Out of each unit of liability that a bank lends out, only a fraction ows out to other banks
subjecting the bank to the cost of interbank interest. A unit increase in the interbank inter-
est rate raises the banks funding cost by this outow fraction. This fraction, determined
by the fabric of the real economy, di¤ers across banks in the generic case.
Third, the heterogeneity in the outow fraction across banks is a source of lending
ine¢ ciency. A bank with a smaller outow fraction has a lower funding cost and thus
charges a lower lending rate. This gives its real-economy borrowers an advantage irrelevant
to their production technologies. As a result, these borrows muster more resources than
they should according to their technologies.
Fourth, not only the sizes of deposits and loans matter, so do the identities of depositors
and borrowers. A deposit of ten-thousand dollars from a programmer benets the bank
more than that from a pig-farmer if it mainly lends to software developers; a loan of half-
million dollars to a software developer is more protable than that to a sausage producer
if the bank receives deposits mainly from programmers.
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Proof of Proposition 1:
By the First Welfare Theorem, the First-Best allocation is attained in the competitive
equilibrium in the absence of the Essential Friction, that is, if rms can obtain resources












This problem is a special case of problem (2) above in which R = 1; intuitively the case in
which rms do not need banks to obtain real resources is equivalent to the case in which
rms pay no costs for banksservices, that is, R = 1: The First-Best demand of Sector i



















for any j 2 J: From (3), it follows that







1 i mi (R;P) :
Hene, if i =  and hence Ri = R














































that is, P is a solution for the market clearing conditions (41) in the First-Best allocation.
Given that these simultaneous equations have a unique solution (as the technologies are all
strictly concave),
P = PFB:





























Proof of Proposition 3:









35 m (R  1) ;
where the term in the square brackets is the rms prot if it faces no friction of payment
and could use its own IOU as a means of payment, and the second termm (R  1) represents
the cost of this friction to the rm; indeed, as was said above, m (R  1) is the cost that
this rm pays for renting the banks commitment power. As a result, if Ri = 1 for any
41
i 2 N; then the equilibrium is reduced to the (perfect) competitive equilibrium. By (14),




then the demand function mi (Ri ;P) is the same as mi

1;P; bAi ; that is, the same as the
rms total demand for resources under the (perfect) competitive equilibrium. Considering
that the demand for each type j 2 J of resources equals 1pj
X
i2N
miij ; then the aggregate
demand for each type of resources in the model economy is equal to that in the competitive
equilibrium with Ai = bAi. Therefore, the equilibrium allocation fxijgi2N;j2J is the same
as that of the competitive equilibrium with Ai = bAi for any i 2 N: According to Welfare
Theorem 1, then, the equilibrium allocation fxijgi2N;j2J is the one that maximizes the















xij = Xj for each j 2 J:
The objective function is strictly concave. Hence, there exists a unique solution to the
maximisation problem. Hence, a unique equilibrium exists.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
We have shown that the quantity of any type of resources that Sector i rms obtain is in
proportion to (1= [1 + rd + (1  fii) ])
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Recall that in the rst best allocation i = 1=N: Hence, i > 

i if and only if 1 + rd +
(1  fii)  < ce (), cMCi < ce () :Moreover, i = max fnj 2 Ng if fii = max ffnnjn 2 Ng ;
i = min fnj 2 Ng if fii = min ffnnjn 2 Ng : Hence the rst part of the proposition is









and 1+(1 fii)1+(1 fnn) is decreasing (increasing) with  if fii > fnn (fii < fnn): Therefore, if
fii = max ffnnjn 2 Ng ; then i is increasing with  and if fii = min ffnnjn 2 Ng then i
is decreasing with :
Q.E.D.
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